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ABSTRACT 
In Dublin city competition within the retail sector is intensifying and city-centre 
department stores, in common with other traders, face many challenges.  Indigenous 
retailers must contend not only with each other, but also with an on-going invasion of 
international retailers who have been attracted by Ireland’s booming economy.  UK 
multiples have made major in-roads into Dublin's retail scene and the city centre's latest 
shopping mall, The Jervis Centre, is so dominated by UK retailers that it has been 
christened  'Little Britain' 
 
In the past fifty years, many of Dublin's once dominant department stores have 
succumbed to the vagaries of retailing.  Now, only three traditional Irish department 
stores continue to trade.   These stores, sometimes referred to as dinosaurs, have managed 
to survive as the wheel of retailing continues its relentless revolutions.  In every direction, 
new or expanded or refurbished shopping centres and shops are in the process of 
completion in the city centre, in satellite towns and outer suburbs.  By the close of 1997 
nearly two million sq. ft. of shopping space will have been built in the capital - the 
biggest investment in retailing for over ten years. 
 
Dublin's unique 18th century streetscape now provides a backdrop for what has become a 
recognised cosmopolitan shopping city.  The concentrated arrival of British multiples has 
brought tangible benefits to consumers via greater choice.  However, the 
internationalisation of Dublin's retail scene has led to fears that indigenous Irish 
companies will be washed away by major UK multiples with greater financial power. 
While rumours of the demise of Dublin's remaining stand-alone Department stores are 
constant and obviously exaggerated, undoubtedly these stores have faced difficult times. 
 
This paper considers the strategic response of Dublin's traditional department stores to 
intensifying competition and provides an insight into the strategic thinking of Irish 
department store managers. 
 
Key Words: Dublin, department stores, retail sector, retail strategy, shopping centres, 
city-centre, competition, specialist stores, multiples, fashion, internationalisation, 
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Introduction 
 
In 1993, the value of the non-food retail market in the Republic of Ireland was  US$4.4 
billion, up by 33 percent in 5 years.1   In Dublin city, the fight for a viable slice of this 
turbulent retail sector is intense and city-centre department stores, in common with other 
traders, have been buffeted by the chill winds of competition.  As the Celtic economy 
booms,  indigenous retailers must contend not only with each other, but also with an on-
going invasion of international retailers.  These retailers, running out of expansion 
options at home, are looking for an acceptable entry location into the Irish market.  The 
exponential growth in available retail selling space has facilitated their entry and 
increased competitive pressures. 
 
There is a consensus that industry changes have disadvantaged department stores and the 
prognosis for their future health is ambiguous, and sometimes negative.  Over the years 
many of Dublin's department stores have succumbed to the radical changes taking place 
in retailing.  Among the survivors are three stand-alone department stores which have 
traded in the heart of Dublin city since the mid-1800s. 
 
This paper, describes the key changes which have taken place in the city's retail 
environment over the past ten years and examines the strategic response of Dublin's three 
stand alone department stores to intensifying competition.  
 
 
Dublin's Stand Alone Department Stores: 
 
Dublin city, capital of the Republic of Ireland, is situated on the east coast of the country.  
In addition to a booming tourist trade, the catchment population for the city-centre 
shopping area is in excess of one million.  This relatively concentrated area has two 
distinct retailing districts, Henry Street and Grafton Street, separated by the river Liffey 
and about seven minutes walking time apart.   Numerous secondary streets feed off  these 
pedestrianised high streets, particularly south of the Liffey in the Grafton Street area. 
 
Grafton Street, with Trinity College at its base and St. Stephen's Green at its apex, has a 
distinctly up-market ambience.  It has always been Dublin's most prestigious high street 
and international retailers vie for space there.  Both Brown Thomas, and Arnotts/River 
Island store are located in Grafton Street, as is a new Marks and Spencers store; St. 
Stephen's Green and Powerscourt Townhouse shopping centres adjoin the Grafton Street 
area.  
 
Henry Street, adjacent to public transport terminals, has traditionally been one of the 
strongest shopping areas in Dublin.  The success of the ILAC centre, possibly Dublin's 
best known shopping mall, and the concentration of the city's largest retailers - Arnotts, 
Dunnes Stores, Penneys, Roches, and Marks and Spencers in one street, contributes to its 
popularity. The new Jervis Centre shopping mall in Mary Street has boosted the drawing 
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power of the area which is now commonly referred to as 'Henry Street Mary Street'.  
Results from independent market research commissioned by Arnotts department store 
show that the Henry Street area attracts 21.7 million shoppers annually, compared with 
7.1 million for the Grafton Street area.  The shopper profile has become more affluent and 
the area now attracts almost twice as many ABC1 shoppers annually than the Grafton 
Street area, 9.5 million shoppers versus 5 million.2 
 
O'Connell Street, Dublin's main thoroughfare, is disappointing from a shopping point of 
view -  financial institutions, fast-food chains, amusement arcades, newsagents, jewellers 
and hotels form the main occupancy.  Three outlets provide the only serious retail offer: a 
flagship Penneys chain store now occupies the premises vacated by BHS's initial failed 
venture, Easons book store adjoins Penneys, and Clerys department store, a landmark 
meeting place for generations of Irish people (under the clock at Clerys), is on the 
opposite side of O'Connell Street's spacious and visually impressive boulevard.   The City 
Fathers now have plans in train to revitalise O’Connell Street as a shopping area, which 
should benefit the existing traders. 
 
Arnotts, Brown Thomas and Clerys, Dublin's three traditional department stores, located 
respectively in Henry Street, Grafton Street and O'Connell Street, (see accompanying 
map) have been part of the fabric of Dublin retailing since the start of the department 
store phenomenon in the mid-1800s.  Each occupies a prime retail site which is its biggest 
asset.  Over the past thirty years many of Dublin's department stores failed to survive; 
household names such as Pims, Todd Burns, Kelletts, and McBirneys succumbed to 
competitor pressure and the radical changes taking place in retailing.  The latest casualty, 
Switzers department store, began to sink into oblivion in 1991 when it was bought from 
the House of Fraser by Brown Thomas. 
 
The commercial ups and downs of each of the department stores are documented in 
anniversary books which celebrate their survival into the late 20th century.3  They make 
interesting and colourful reading.  The parallel between their fortunes and changes in the 
social and economic fabric of the city emphasises the impact of the external environment 
on individual firms; their histories mirror the economic and social experience of the 
people of Dublin.  This is well expressed in the book published to celebrate the 50th 
anniversary of Denis Guiney's purchase of Clerys:  
 
From Butt to Parnell, from the Fenians to the Easter 
Rising, from the foundations of the Land League to 
the Eucharistic Congress, from the great lock out of 
1913 to the new economic policies of Sean Lemass, 
Clerys had played a significant role in the changing 
life of Ireland's capital, witnessing the triumphs and 
disasters of five generations.4 
 
The fact that these three department stores have survived the vagaries of retailing is proof 
of their stamina.   
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Map of Dublin City Centre Shopping Area 
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The 1990s has brought a welcome renaissance to Dublin and created a modern 
cosmopolitan shopping city.  This environment is now intensely competitive and, in 
Darwinian terms, perhaps only the fittest will survive into the new millennium. The 
following review illustrates the opportunities and threats which department store 
managers face as the retail environment becomes increasingly complex and turbulent. 
 
 
The evolution of Dublin into a cosmopolitan shopping city 
 
In 1997,  Dublin was awarded the title of "Europe's Most Improved City for Business" by 
Fortune, a leading international business magazine.  Fortune commented that 
'improvements to Dublin's city centre has led to a vibrancy that some people say hasn't 
been seen since Dublin's golden age 200 years ago'.5  
 
Several interlinking factors contributed to Dublin's current high standing: 
 
• The pro-active approach of  The Dublin City-Centre Business Association (DCCBA) 
in improving the shopping environment in the city. 
 • A policy of inner-city renewal which offered tax incentives and rent rebates and  
encouraged property developers to rejuvenate designated sections of the inner city. 
• Ireland's Celtic tiger economy which boomed in the early 90s following stringent, but 
successful fiscal policies. 
• Favourable economic and industry circumstances encouraged indigenous retailers to 
up-grade their offer and attracted large numbers of  international retailers to locate in 
Dublin. 
 
 
City-centre improvements 
 
Although the US opened its first regional shopping centre in Seattle in 19506,  it was the 
late 60s before such developments blew winds of change through Dublin's shopping 
scene.  In 1966 the first planned shopping centre development opened in Stillorgan,  by 
the end of the 1960s nine shopping centres had opened in suburbia. The increased 
competition from an ever growing number of out-of-town shopping centres was a major 
threat to city centre retailers. In the early 70s, as regional shopping centres began to 
develop throughout the rest of the country life became even tougher for Dublin retailers. 
 
The first city-based shopping centre was built in 1979 and since then many centres have 
been opened.  The novelty of the shopping centres changed the flow-path of shoppers, 
e.g. research experts say that Henry Street, north of the Liffey, showed a decline in 
pedestrian flows of 45% in 1988, coinciding with the opening of the St. Stephen's Green 
Centre.  In 1990, Grafton Street showed a significant drop in December pedestrian flows, 
when The Square opened in Tallaght and it took until 1993 for normal footfall levels to 
recovery.7  As traders lost out to suburban and regional shopping centres, city-centre 
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businesses also had to contend with a rising crime rate in Dublin city, traffic congestion, 
and poor parking facilities.  
 
Since the early 1980s the DCCBA has been fighting to provide an ambience which would 
attract shoppers back into the city.  Retailers were encouraged to refurbish and up-date 
shop fronts and to standardise shopping hours.  Over the years, improved security 
arrangements, pedestrianisation, additional car parks, attractive street furniture, seating, 
shrubs, lighting, litter bins and art work have been put in place to create a pleasant 
environment that has dramatically improved the city's shopping environment.   
 
Inner-city renewal 
 
The planned urban regeneration programme, which was EU and government funded, 
succeeded in revitalising the city, e.g. the rejuvenated Temple Bar area project in the 
inner city is credited with creating 1,930 long-term jobs in the cultural and services 
industries.  From being a semi-derelict part of the city, Temple Bar now succours 160 
new business, and pedestrian number through the area have trebled since 1991.8 
 
Between 1971 and 1991, the population of Dublin's inner city had fallen from 131,503 to 
76,558, a drop of almost 50%.  Since 1991, there has been a reversal of that trend and 
over 14,000 people have moved in to live in the centre city; this number is expected to 
rise to  over 25,000 by the end of the decade. The great majority of the new influx of 
residents are young people, mostly single, giving a new vibrancy to Dublin.9   
 
In the three decades to 1996, the growth in retail selling space had been steady, but 
unspectacular; 3.5 million square feet of  shopping space had been developed in the city 
and suburbs.10  Since 1996, over 1.5 million square feet of purpose-built shopping space 
has been developed in the capital; during 1996/97, an estimated £400m was invested in 
Dublin's city-centre and suburban environs.  Government tax  and rent incentives 
encouraged major development in the Henry Street Mary Street area, which included the 
new Jervis Centre and a massive extension to Arnotts department store.11 
 
 
The Celtic Tiger Economy 
 
As the Irish economy continues to grow more strongly than that of any other OECD 
country, a strong growth in real disposable incomes, further gains in employment, rising 
asset prices and expectations of falling interest have all contributed to fuelling consumer 
spending.  In 1997, GNP grew by an estimated 8.5 to 9%12, this compares favourably 
with a 2.5% overall growth in Ireland's main trading partners.  Employment grew by an 
estimated 4% and a further increase of 3.5% is expected in 1998.13   Positive economic 
circumstances have created more than 77,000 new jobs in the city between 1990 and 
1997. Demand for housing is unprecedented; the consumer 'feel-good' factor is tangible 
and is reflected in the number of new cars on the road, an increase of 25,000 (105.5%)  
between 1993 and 1997.14   
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From a retailing perspective, the down side to these positive developments is that 
mortgage and car loan repayments reduce discretionary spending capacity, although both 
the Retail Sales and Retail Volume Index remain healthy.  The volume index increase of 
7.9% in 1997 is higher than in any other year in recent history,15 while the consumer price 
index increased by only 1.5% on an annual average basis.16 
 
The internationalisation of  the retail environment 
 
The Irish retail trade has been revolutionised over the last eight years by an explosion of 
concession shops, specialist chains, UK and other multiples opening in the capital.  
Indigenous retailers have risen to the challenge posed by new traders and new formats by 
up-grading and extending premises.  Arnotts, Brown Thomas, Clerys, and a myriad of 
other smaller stores, have invested heavily in refurbishment, and sometimes in massive 
expansions.  Established international retailers, e.g. Penneys and Marks and Spencers are 
also investing for the future. 
 
In the late 60s and through the 70s and 80s, some UK retailers opened stores in Dublin, 
with mixed results -  BHS, MFI and Tesco were among the failures, but some early 
entrants,  e.g. Marks and Spencers and Laura Ashley traded successfully.  Although the 
early 90s had seen a consistent trickle of UK multiples into the Dublin scene, the 
availability of prime retail space in the city centre in 1996 fuelled what is commonly 
referred to as the 'invasion' of British Multiples into the Dublin Market.  However, while 
the perennial tug-of-trade between inner city and the suburbs was broadly counter-
balanced by the near simultaneous opening of both the Jervis Centre in the city and 
Blanchardstown Shopping Centre in the suburbs, the tenancy of these new centres 
epitomises the UK retailer phenomenon.   
 
Covering 330,000 square feet and costing £50 million, The Jervis centre provided a 
springboard into Dublin for  big-name UK retailers, e.g. Boots, Dixons and Debenhams.  
BHS used the centre for its second coming into the Irish market; Marks & Spencer's Mary 
Street store links into the Jervis centre.  Jervis is so dominated by UK retailers that 
Dublin wags have christened it  'Little Britain'.   In Blanchardstown, almost a quarter of 
the total space of the £100 million, 650,000 square foot shopping centre was taken by 
retailers from Britain and Northern Ireland.17  1996 was also the year of the LSU (Large 
Space User).  In the new retail warehousing park opened at Blanchardstown Town 
Centre, electrical retailer Currys is trading out of a 30,000 square foot superstore, while 
its sister company, PC World, has taken 20,000 square feet  Marks and Spencers, Boots 
and Tesco will  be anchor tenants for Dublin's new Liffey Valley shopping centre opening 
in Autumn 1998.  Some of the newer arrivals have accelerated their expansion through 
acquisition, e.g. Boots has taken over a well-known chain of chemist shops, Hayes 
Conyngham & Robinson and thus achieved entry into ten prime locations in Dublin city 
and suburbs. 
 
The internationalisation of Dublin's retail scene has led to fears that indigenous Irish 
companies will be washed away by major UK multiples with greater financial power and 
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that the traditional diversity of Dublin's shopping scene will be lost.  The following 
description, titled  'A Stroll Down Grafton Street', catches the flavour of what is 
happening in Dublin city:  
 
A walk down Grafton Street immediately reveals that the 
personalised stores of days gone by - including the 
Monument Creameries, the Eblana book shop and 
McConnells - have all been replaced by UK chain stores 
like Jigsaw, Miss Selfridge, Monsoon and Warehouse. But 
the dubious delights of so-called Euroshopping in the form 
of McDonalds, Dunkin' Donuts, Burger King, HMV, Tie 
Rack and Sock Shop are all much in evidence.  If you add 
to these the bulk of the remainder of the stores on Grafton 
Street - Laura Ashley, Next, Principles, River Island and 
The Body Shop, not to mention Marks & Spencers - you 
end up with a street which is predominately British and 
remarkably similar to the average UK high street.18 
 
Property experts anticipate that the demand for retail space will not be confined to UK 
retailers; C & A, a big-name Dutch retailer, is using the new Liffey Valley centre as its 
entry point to the Irish market.  As the number of US retailers expand in Britain, they are 
expected to target Ireland, particularly Dublin19.  US retailer, Gymboree, has located in 
Grafton Street and  TK Maxx has acquired premises at St. Stephen's Green shopping 
centre. 
 
In response to increased demand for units, Zone A rents in Grafton Street are expected to 
break the £200 per square foot barrier.  While high street rents are now out of reach of 
many retailers, this has brought about a regeneration of many side shopping streets, e.g. 
South Anne Street and Wicklow Street which adjoin Grafton Street, have both been 
revitalised.  To some extent, all retailers have benefited by improved footfall throughout 
the city.20 
 
Dublin's unique 18th century streetscape now provides a backdrop for what has become a 
recognised cosmopolitan shopping city.  The concentrated arrival of British multiples has 
contributed to the city's buzz and  has brought tangible benefits to consumers via greater 
choice; the improved choice has stopped the drift of Dublin consumers to Belfast for 
Christmas shopping and people from outside Dublin who stopped shopping there during 
the 80s and early 90s have been tempted back. 
 
Department Stores and retail strategy 
 
While the gambit of strategy determinants are multiple and complex, many of the issues 
of strategic development are concerned with changing strategic capability to fit a 
changing environment better.21  Devising a successful strategy is a challenging process;  a 
successful strategy gains and maintains competitive advantage, a less than successful 
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strategy leads to strategic drift.  Four factors, efficiency, quality, innovation and customer 
responsiveness, are the generic building blocks of competitive advantage.22  Ansoff's 
Product/Mission matrix  and Porter's Generic Competitive Strategies provide a 
conceptual framework within which to consider strategy decisions.23  Figure 1 shows the 
mix of inter-related development strategies which managers can exploit to gain and 
maintain competitive advantage.  
 
STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT 
OPTIONS 
Competitive options 
€  Cost Based 
€  Differentiation
    €  Broad
    €  Focused
Possible Routes 
€  Withdrawal 
€  Consolidation
€  Market penetration 
€  Product development
€  Market development 
€  Diversification
Choice of methods 
€  Internal development 
€  Joint Development/ 
   alliances
€  Acquisition
Figure 1: Inter-Related Development Strategies
Generic Strategies
 
 
Daivd Walters in his book Retailing Management: Analysis, Planning and Control 
proposes a strategic and operational decision model which reflects how strategy develops 
within a retailing enterprise, and which includes the elements of time and return.24  Figure 
2 illustrates. 
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Figure 2: Strategic and Operational decisions 
£ 
Revenue 
Profit
0 Time
Strategic 
Decision
Operational 
Decisions 
Diversification 
New Format
Growth
Strategic 
Repositioning 
Product-Market
Related Growth
Operational 
Repositioning 
Consolidation + 
Productivity
 
Source: David Walters (1994) Retailing Management: Analysis, Planning and Control.  Reproduced with 
permission from The MACMILLAN PRESS LTD., Basingstoke, UK 
 
Consolidation and productivity is concerned with improving performance from the 
existing base, operational repositioning may require small, incremental adjustments to 
service and merchandise attributes to maintain customer loyalty, product/market growth 
refers to growing the existing business, strategic repositioning refers to revising a 
company's image to attract new market segments, new format growth involves developing 
new offers which are based upon an existing format, e.g. a successful specialisation, 
within a larger format, may become a multiple operation in its own right.  
 
Strategic decisions can be placed on a continuum which relates strategic choice to risk 
and reward.  Low risk strategies such as consolidation and market penetration are likely 
to be least rewarding, but high risk strategies which involve substantial investment in 
growth should attract a high return.  Figure 3 shows the theoretical relationship between 
operational and  strategic decisions and risk and return. 
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£ 
Revenue 
Profit
Risk
Increasing
Diversification 
Product-Market
Related Growth
Operational 
Repositioning 
Consolidation + 
Productivity
New Format Growth 
Strategic Repositioning 
Figure 3: Strategic decisions, Risk and Returns.
 
 
The literature suggests that traditionally, retailers tended to be stronger on tactics than on 
strategy;25  more concerned with  'reacting quickly and positively in order to meet the 
day-to-day problems of running their businesses in a fast-moving and highly competitive 
environment'.26    Omura  pointed out that when discussions on the strategic planning 
concept took place in academic and management circles, the focus was on manufacturing 
firms, with less attention being given to the application of these concepts to retailing 
firms.27  Nowadays, few would argue with the contention that retail strategy must respond 
to changes in the structure of the industry and the nature and rate of social and economic 
change. While reactive strategies may suffice when the external environment is changing 
slowly, 'in a turbulent environment, reactionary responses may be fatal.'28   
 
Davies &  Brooks (1989) argue that for retailers: "By comparison with other business 
sectors, from a strategic perspective, suppliers, customers, potential entrants and 
substitutes are less important than the competition that exists within any one particular 
sector".29  Certainly, companies play an important part in shaping the markets in which 
they compete,30 thus the generic strategies (cost leadership/differentiation/focus) adopted 
by rival firms is inextricably linked to the evolution of markets.31  The way one company 
changes or fine-tunes its strategy over time affects the way the other companies in the 
industry pursue theirs. The intensity of competitive rivalry makes it difficult to maintain 
an exclusive 'position' within a market and by the mature stage of the industry cycle, 
competitors inevitably appreciate how interrelated their strategies are.32  
 
As detailed earlier, the competitive environment in Dublin is intense and is likely to 
become more so as international retailers now perceive fewer barriers to entry to the 
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Dublin market.33   The end result of the industry structure changes is that an increasing 
number of competitors are jockeying  for position. Berry points out that 'overstoring' puts 
pressure on companies as "the level of retailing effectiveness required for survival 
continues to rise."34    
 
All companies are concerned with establishing a basis on which to build sustainable 
competitive advantage, but it is widely accepted that, on a global basis, industry changes 
have had negative consequences for department stores;  it is even suggested that 
traditional department stores, sometimes termed the dinosaurs of retailing,  may be in the 
declining stages of the retail life cycle.35 
 
From the 60s on, several social factors simultaneously disadvantaged department stores.  
Rising car ownership gave consumers mobility, but department stores, built in an earlier 
era and mainly located in  high streets, couldn't capitalise on this because they lacked 
parking facilities.  In theory, the social mobility which swelled the middle classes and the 
increased prosperity which flowed from dual income families should have benefited 
department stores.  However, more women joining the work force left less time for 
leisure shopping and rising incomes and changing lifestyles changed the emphasis from 
value to rapidly-changing fashion.  Ominously, the most potent threat to department 
stores came from the proliferation of multiple and specialist chain stores which crowded 
into high streets and new urban shopping centres.   
 
Although traditional department stores would never have aspired to cost leadership, 
multiples and specialist chain shops, because of their critical mass and product 
concentration, have considerable clout with suppliers; they can source and market goods 
more cheaply than can a single, diffusely stocked, department store.  In today's 
competitive environment, other operational handicaps - high staff costs associated with 
quality service, high maintenance costs associated with large buildings and high stock 
costs associated with a wide range of product offerings, some of which are bound to be 
slow-moving, put department stores at a cost disadvantage. 
 
Differentiation, once the hallmark of department stores, is now problematic.  Davies and 
Brooks put forward the view that focus is synonymous with market segmentation and that 
segmentation and differentiation are associated retailing strategies, commonly referred to 
as 'positioning'.36   Johnson (1987) describes the many benefits that can flow from a 
successful positioning strategy: higher barriers to entry for competitors, high customer 
loyalty, more price-flexibility, slimmer stock, reduced supplier power.37   However, 
successful positioning strategies may be rapidly imitated38 and the bases for 
differentiation may change over time.  Establishing a clear target market is intrinsic to 
successful positioning, but problems arise when everyone 'shoots at the same target'.39  
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Specialist and chain stores are well-positioned to pursue a focus differentiation strategy. 
Specialist stores often offer customers a deeper and wider choice of goods than the 
Department store can feasibly supply.  Fashion chains such as Next and Oasis  target very 
specific market segments with highly focused product offers.  Market development 
strategies  pursued by Multiples are based on what has been called a generic strategy of 
multifocus differentiation,40 supported by a low cost base accrued through economies of 
scale. Some of these multiples have been likened to 'diversified merchandise 
conglomerates',41 e.g. among its repertoire, Burtons has Top Shop and Top Man for the 
younger market and Principles for fashion buyers.  In contrast, because of the diffuse 
nature of its offerings, department stores can run into problems because 'the store itself, 
the fixtures and fittings, the decor and store ambience, and the staff may not be 
differentiated according to the different market segment needs'.42  
 
Increasingly, department stores have become  'stuck in the middle'43  as they be struggle 
to adjust to the industry changes.   Traditional advantages like the 'everything under one 
roof' concept offered by department stores lost its special meaning when in-town and out-
of-town shopping centres began to provide alternative, somewhat comparable, and more 
convenient, shopping venues. The ubiquitous credit card has undermined the advantages 
of the original department store card which imputed a measure of prestige to the holder 
and was designed to encourage loyalty.  Irish consumers are now offered a surfeit of 
loyalty cards from chain stores and supermarket outlets which reward a purchasing 
consumer with accumulated points which periodically translate into cash vouchers.  
Dunnes Stores 'Value Card' and Tesco's 'Club  Card' are examples of this system in 
action. It is argued that customer loyalty is fundamental to the survival and prosperity of 
department stores; 44 a counter-argument by Davies and Brooks45 puts forward the view 
that because switching costs are so low, a retailer's most fickle asset is customer loyalty; 
that segmentation is problematical and that 'customers can and do move from one 
segment to another, altering their purchasing behaviour to suit a purchasing occasion, a 
short-term change in financial circumstances, or a change in mood'.  
 
A strategy of broad differentiation, unique in terms of dimensions widely valued by 
buyers but   different from competitors,46 may be a viable option for department stores.  
Bradley and Taylor argue that the requirements for competitive success in the retail sector 
are changing; that while sites, technology and merchandise are still important, the 
emphasis in terms of critical success factors has shifted to human resources47 which is a 
new development for the retail sector.  There is a new 'focus on service and on the 
interface between customer and staff'.48  This is an area where department stores should 
have a particular strength; they come from a tradition of service which, with some notable 
exceptions, is largely alien to the self-service culture of the chain store multiples.  
However, sensitivity to customer service has risen across all sections  of retailing and 
services and recent UK research has shown that sadly, the quality of  department store 
service now fall well short of the standards of some other retailers.49 
 
Department stores world-wide would appear to have been guilty of strategic drift.  The 
challenges which department stores must meet in a hostile competitive environment 
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highlight the difficulty of carving out a distinctive competitive advantage and the 
prognosis for department stores is ambiguous. While authors detail their decline in the 
US, in Europe and in Singapore, these same commentators, and others,  also acknowledge 
that department stores are implementing survival/revival strategies which are working, 
e.g. closing weaker stores, dropping uncompetitive specialist departments like electricals, 
rationalising product line to concentrate on the high-margin fashion sector, increasing 
concessions, reducing staff numbers and to a limited extent replacing full-time staff with 
part-time workers.50  
 
More pro-active growth strategies have seen department stores diversifying into 
alternative retail options such as mail order or specialist shops, developing own brands, 
investing in major refurbishment - especially of flagship stores, and expanding outwards 
from traditional high street locations to become anchor tenants in shopping malls. 
 
A summary profile of Dublin's Traditional Department Stores (1988-1998) 
 
Arnotts 
 
Arnotts flagship store has traded from its Henry Street site since 1843.  The parent 
company also trades from two smaller department stores, Boyers in North Earl Street and 
Arnotts/River Island Franchise in Grafton Street and from a shoe store in Stillorgan 
shopping centre.   
 
1988, a litmus year for Arnotts, saw the company take some hard decisions.  In the 
previous year, high in-store costs had forced the company to rationalise departments and 
look for staff redundancies.  Following a succession of poor trading results, both its 
wholesaling and manufacturing businesses were shed and Ballet International was sold 
off.   The closure of wholesale freed-up £3m. for reinvestment in retailing and the 
company decided to up-grade both its range of merchandise and its store.  It used the 
extra space to build on its reputation for instore events, inviting celebrities, media and 
sporting personalities to meet customers in its Henry Street store.  Electronic Point of 
Sale (EPOS) was installed in 1990. 
 
1991 was an active year.  The company opened its shoe store in Stillorgan shopping 
centre and a £5 million in-store reconstruction programme was started in the Henry Street 
store which increased space by 20,000 square feet.  When the new interior was completed 
in 1992, a new balcony fashion gallery allowed the store to improve its concession offer.  
A River Island franchise got space in the lower ground floor and was so successful that 
Arnott's  Grafton Street store is now shared with the River Island franchise. A 
Manchester United Memorabilia outlet was an added attraction.   Following these 
improvements Arnotts enjoyed a doubling of profits between 1988 and 1992; margins 
improved from 4% to 9.6%. 
 
In 1994/5 the company took advantage of tax shelters.  Using company property, most of 
which fell within the tax designated area, Arnotts started a massive extension (130,000 
15 
square feet) of its Henry Street Store  It also made a tax beneficial investment in the Irish 
made 'Michael Collins' film.  The new store, which opens onto three streets, now has 
320,00 sq.ft. of  selling space and is the largest department store in Ireland and the fifth 
largest in the UK and Ireland.   
 
Arnotts used the additional space to increase the range and depth of proven departments 
like men's and women's fashions, furniture and children's clothes; 25,000 square feet is 
dedicated to its children's offering of fashion, footwear and toys - all major brands are 
stocked and the company has one of the best selections under one roof for children - 
'people will feel that they will have to look here first, even if they don't buy.'  Product 
range has been extended via a concession to Courts Electrical and product adjustments 
have seen Arnotts buyers alter their furniture strategy to include a range which caters for 
the new city dwellers living in smaller apartments.   
 
To support a 'one stop shop' concept, its four restaurants offer breakfast, lunch and 
afternoon tea and its product range is comprehensive. An in-store ATM and Bureau de 
Change facilitates everyday shoppers and tourists.  The company is currently investing £6 
million in redeveloping the ground floor of the Henry Street store; it has opened a section 
of its 'Impulse Department' which includes the concessions Kookai and Esprit to cater for 
the 18-35 year old female.  In 1997 a multi-storey car park was added and from 
September 1998 the company will extend its opening hours and trade on Sundays from 12 
noon to 6 p.m.  Later this year a 3,500 square feet exhibition hall will be opened, as will 
an 18,000 square feet discount centre.  This centre will offer bought in 'specials' and 
clearance merchandise.   
 
Arnotts sees its image as 'middle to better' and defines its mission statement as aspiring to 
be 'The Department Store', a theme which is also carried in its advertising.   'One Stop 
Shop' is the positioning strategy - to be the authoritative department store offering variety, 
choice, brands and value.  The store is brand led and a lot of its advertising is in terms of 
'top name specials' which highlights brands and prices.  The mix of concession shops is 
weighted towards the growing, more affluent ABC1 shoppers.  While acknowledging that 
the Jervis shopping centre has improved the city centre shopping offer, as part of its 
competitor tactics   management makes sure that the company is not undersold by any 
trader in the Jervis shopping centre.  
 
The ability to make retailing entertainment, to 'keep changing, to keep adding products, to 
present an Aladdin's cave with display, presentation and merchandising' is thought to be 
critical.  The company sees its reputation for service and product knowledge as key 
success factors and staff training to support this is an on-doing process.  To date, the 
company has invested £50 million developing the store and has no plans to move outside 
the Dublin area. 
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Brown Thomas 
 
Brown Thomas, established in 1848 by Hugh Brown and James Thomas,  lays claim to be 
Dublin's most prestigious, up-market department store.  During its 150 years, the store 
has changed hands many times.  From 1919-33  it was owned by the legendary American, 
Harry Gordon Selfridge, a visionary exponent of department stores.  In 1970, when there 
was talk of the store closing down, it was bought by Galen Weston, a wealthy Canadian 
whose family property included the famous department store, Fortnum and Mason.  
(Weston is married to Hiliary Frayne, a top Irish model, who had been associated with 
Brown Thomas fashion shows. Mrs. Weston is often cited as the inspiration behind the 
Weston purchase of Brown Thomas.)51  A brief flirtation with the Stock Market ended in 
1983 when Brown Thomas returned to family ownership and became the personal holding 
of Gale and Hilary Weston. 
 
In 1988, The Brown Thomas Group consisted of the Brown Thomas Speciality Store, a 
chain of 'A-Wear' stores which targeted a younger market (fashion conscious but budget 
restricted), and the Bailey Pub in Dublin's Duke Street. 
 
The company generated shock-waves throughout the Irish retail sector when, in 1991, it 
bought the ailing Switzer Group from the House of Fraser.  (Switzers Department Store, 
situated across the street from Brown Thomas, had graced Grafton Street since 1838 and 
had been bought by Waterford Glass and a subsidiary of the House of Fraser in 1971).  In 
addition to the flagship store, Brown Thomas also acquired three well-established 
department stores, Cashs of Cork, Moons of Galway and Todds of Limerick. The 
unexpected acquisition laid the way for an even bigger sensation two years later when it 
was announced that the two shops on Grafton Street were to merge.   
 
Brown Thomas spent £23 million creating a new store on the Switzers premises, but the 
Switzer name, which signified an upper-middle bracket department store, was dropped.  
The redesigned store had floor space of 158,000 square feet.  In 1995 the new store 
opened to acclaim and in its first year won an award as 'The Best Department Store in 
Ireland and the UK'. 
 
In 1987/88 Brown Thomas was planning its strategy for the 90s.  It started by 
implementing a process of staff rationalisation concurrent with negotiations with the 
House of Fraser for the purchase of the Switzers Group.  Poor trading conditions and the 
extra costs associated with these redundancy payments led to accumulated losses of over 
£2 million in 1990, but by 1991 these losses had fallen to £907,000 as the benefits of 
rationalisation came through.  
 
In 1993 Brown Thomas discontinued the Switzer and Brown Thomas store cards and 
replaced them with a Brown Thomas master credit card which offers customers a 10% 
discount across all Group stores. 
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With the merger, Brown Thomas management set out to 'create a totally new business, to 
combine the best of the two businesses under one.' While Brown Thomas' business lay 
mainly in the high end of men's and women's fashions and accessories, Switzers strengths, 
in addition to its fashion departments, lay in electrical, kitchenware, soft furnishings and 
glassware.  Maintaining the same price structure, these departments were incorporated 
into the new store. The merger changed Brown Thomas from a speciality store to a 
department store.  Because retail selling space was tighter in the new store, some 
concessions had to go and there was a further degree of staff rationalisation.  Innovations 
included additional services e.g. two new restaurants, an interior design consultant, and a 
personal shopping service targeted at the corporate sector. EPOS, which was not in either 
business prior to the merger, is installed in the new store. Brown Thomas was the first 
traditional department store to open for business on Sundays and Bank Holiday Mondays.  
 
In 1997 a new 350 car park facility was added; in 1998 a Brown Thomas (BT2) store 
devoted to designer sportswear was opened on the old Marks and Spencers site in Grafton 
Street. The company is in the process of developing and refurbishing its other department 
stores.  The Cork store, originally Cashs of Cork, is now Brown Thomas Cork.  As each 
department store project is completed, the store will be renamed.  
 
Brown Thomas describes its target market as "middle to upper - Ireland doesn't have 
enough 'top-top customers' to make this segment on its own viable".  Market research 
undertaken in the planning stage showed that, despite the move, Brown Thomas 
customers would be loyal, but Switzers customers were wary of the Brown Thomas name, 
which connoted higher prices.  The traditional Brown Thomas customer was upper 
middle class, in the 40-55 age bracket.  While acknowledging that some Switzers 
customers have been lost, management says that the new store has found a new breed of 
customer  - younger (aged 20-30) and affluent - who previously didn't shop in either 
Brown Thomas (because of its older image) or Switzers (because its product range didn't 
meet their needs).  These younger, affluent, well travelled people find the new store more 
contemporary and on a par with stores in the US and Europe.  
 
In terms of differentiation, management is satisfied that the name of Brown Thomas is 
synonymous with service but the amalgamation of different environments and different 
cultures posed challenges.  Merchandise is also distinctive  - 'the same mix of 
merchandise doesn't exist in any other Irish department store, or even in any combination 
of other department stores'. Sixty per cent of products stocked are exclusive to Brown 
Thomas and the new stock reflects the change in the store's segmentation strategy - new 
brands, e.g. Mac make-up and new labels - Tommy Hilfiger, Versace, and DKNY add a 
young image appeal and the revamped men's department is extensive. 
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The new Brown Thomas has a mission statement which aspires to be the top department 
store in Europe in terms of merchandise, people, customer service,  environment and 
profitability.  New arrivals , e.g. Debenhams in the Jervis Centre have had no impact on 
strategy - "we don't constantly look over our shoulder - we have our own vision - we set 
the standards".  The company has no plans for expansion within Ireland, but would 
consider moving abroad if the right opportunity arose.   
 
Clerys 
 
Clerys foundations go back to 1853.  Situated on Dublin's main civic thoroughfare, 
O'Connell Street, the store has long been  associated with the name of Denis Guiney, 
legendary in Dublin's retail circles, who rescued Clerys from bankruptcy in 1941.  A 
Guiney's original department store (famous for its sales and discounted merchandise), 
Clerys the Square, At Home with Clerys, plus the flagship Clerys, remain under the 
control of the Guiney family.  Denis Guiney's widow, Mary, is Chairman of the company 
and although now in her 90s, she regularly attends Board meetings. 
 
Clerys store has a four floor structure and 115,000 square feet of selling space.  Because 
O'Connell Street is not a browsing street, Clerys could be termed a 'destination' store' - 
people who shop in Clerys do so with a large amount of prior intent.  Its size, location and 
Irishness draws a strong tourist trade and it provides a direct mail service for tourists as 
well as a bureau de change. 
 
Boosted by the Millennium celebrations, 1988 was a good trading year for Clerys, it was 
also the year in which Clerys introduced a concessioned Ms. Selfridge to the Dublin 
market.  In 1992 a new Chief Executive was appointed.  In that year also, Clerys the 
Square store was opened  in The Square shopping centre in Tallaght and several 
attractions were added to the main store:  four concession run restaurants, a Scholl's shoe 
department and a new sports department were among the new offerings. Unfortunately, 
adverse economic circumstances and the difficult trading conditions which prevailed in 
1992 saw profits fall by 2.5% and the following year the company was forced to seek 60 
staff redundancies. 
 
In 1994 market research revealed that Clerys appeal was predominantly to the older 
customer, particularly males aged 50 plus.  The company put in train a three year 
development plan, which involved targeting  a new generation of 25 to 40 year old 
customers, mainly female, developing a corporate identity in terms of customer 
communications, enhancing the store, training staff, and improving procedures. 
 
Initially the focus was on getting the product right; produce lines were rationalised, 
merchandise was upgraded and a wide range of fashion concessions, which are reviewed 
on a six monthly basis, was introduced.  Many of these concessions were initially 
exclusive to Clerys, but this is no longer the case; Clerys, Arnotts, Brown Thomas and 
Debenhams  endure a degree of overlap and some concessions have opened independent 
outlets.  However, buyers are constantly focused on acquiring new brands. The store now 
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carries a comprehensive range of branded fashions to suit females of all ages and sizes.   
A 'Jean store' and targeted concessions strengthened the younger men's fashion offer and 
Ladybird books and clothing for children was introduced as an additional attraction to the 
children's department. Weekday trading hours were extended and following a substantial 
investment in information technology, EPOS was introduced in May of '96.  In 1997 the 
store opened an additional 11,000 square foot furniture showcase in Leopardstown Retail 
Park in South Dublin. 
 
The implementation of the store and staff development programme, due to commence in 
1997, was deferred to 1998.  It was decided to take another year out to ensure that the 
design features and the placing of departments within the store were exactly right.   In 
1996 the store had 23 traditional Clery departments and 40 concessions; today the 
emphasis has changed and Clerys has 37 own bought departments and 38 concessions. It 
has just launched an instore 'Irish only shop' which promotes Irish brands. 
 
Both the refurbishment and staff development programme are now in hand and the first 
phase of the £7 - £10 million refurbishment plan to modernise the interior is underway.  
Negotiations are complete to introduce several new concessions which will be exclusive 
to the Irish retail market and attractive to the 25-40 female market.  In 1998 Clerys 
became one of fifteen companies  associated with the newly introduced Hibernian Swift 
Points Master/Loyalty Card. 
 
Clerys is happy to see itself as a middle-market department store which is heavily 
branded and on the way to being well-positioned.  It is gradually shedding its old-
fashioned image.  It seeks to offer quality branded products,  providing value and choice 
for its customers.  Staff who have been with the company for year have a well-engrained 
culture of customer service and deep product knowledge.  Because few concessions are 
now exclusive to Clerys, differentiation is hard to achieve, but the company sees its 
'Dublin' image and the comfort of shopping in Clerys as sources of competitive 
advantage.  
 
The company formally considered the impact of the Jervis centre opening, but didn't see 
any reason to change its present strategy, which is reviewed on a yearly basis.  Managing 
change is a gradual process and the company feels that it has come a long way in four 
years.  It currently has no plans to extend or expand. 
 
Discussion 
 
Dublin's traditional department stores are vigorously implementing a range of strategies 
to enable them to survive and grow; the changing nature of the Dublin market has acted 
as a catalyst.  As is usual for strategic groups within an industry, their strategies have 
common elements, but they also have key points of difference. Their approaches range 
from proactive to reactive and from high risk to low risk; the results of these strategies are 
also varied. 
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Common Approaches: 
 
A blend of  generic strategies 
 
Dublin's traditional department stores continue to develop a generic strategy of broad 
differentiation based on adding value for customers through service, quality, brands and 
reputation which are seen as critical success factors.  Within this dominant strategy, the 
development of  specialisms suggests that the stores are moving towards selectively 
incorporating focus strategies which build on their strengths, e.g. Arnotts gave more space 
to already successful departments, Brown Thomas opened a designer sportswear store.  
The development of specialisms is a competitive response to industry changes which 
attempts to provide a depth and width of range which will appeal to specific market 
segment needs.   
 
Development Routes 
 
When the vicissitudes of the economy and market changes undermined profitability,  the 
stores engaged in consolidation/protection strategies aimed at containing losses and 
improving productivity: staff numbers were reduced, product lines were rationalised and 
technology was up-graded.  Although time periods and time scales differ, for each 
company its consolidation strategy acted as the foundation stone for future growth. The 
stores did not confine themselves to one development route; in 1988,  Arnotts managed to 
simultaneously implement a withdrawal, consolidation, and growth strategy as it 
withdrew from manufacturing and wholesaling, rationalised departments and reduced 
staff numbers, and invested in store improvements. 
 
An intrinsic component of the department stores' strategy is incremental improvements in 
both merchandise and customer services, i.e. operational repositioning - they are 
constantly seeking to improve the attributes of their customer offer.  EPOS has improved 
both the timeliness and the quality of information and market research now underpins 
both operational and strategic repositioning.  
 
The stores have pursued a range of interrelated growth strategies based on a blend of 
broad differentiation and focus.  Up-grading premises, improving instore ambience, 
extending the range of services and merchandise, maintains their mature market appeal 
and increases the likelihood of successful market penetration.  All stores have improved 
product delivery.  Extended trading now keeps the stores open beyond normal business 
hours and Sunday opening caters for both the time budget shopper and the leisure 
shopper.  Enhanced store cards and affinity cards build customer loyalty and provide 
information for direct marketing.  The added enrichment of car parking facilities brings 
the stores 'nearer' to car driving consumers.   
 
All stores have engaged in strategic repositioning.  Extensive product development, 
mainly driven by partnership concessions, has been a central plank in reorienting the 
stores to appeal to a younger customer.  Research findings suggest a definite link between 
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brands offered and store image.52  In the past, department stores have had little appeal for 
the youth market and most of their offers have been targeted to the more mature market 
which is deemed to be attracted by store ambience and service.  If the stores succeed in 
retaining the mature market through operational repositioning while simultaneously 
attracting  the younger, fashion conscious consumer, then they will have the best of  both 
worlds.  It makes sense for the department stores to attempt to broaden their appeal to a 
younger market segment.  Although the Irish market is ageing, it is doing so more slowly 
than other European countries, the 1996 Census shows a relatively young age profile for 
the population of Dublin city and county: 71 percent of the population is under 45, and 30 
percent is between 25 and 45.  If the department stores can tap into an earlier stage of the 
life-cycle of Dubliners and achieve a degree of loyalty from a younger age group, then 
they have a greater chance of retaining them into the grey market.  A counter-argument 
might suggest that targeting the younger market puts them in direct competition with 
international chains and that too many stores will now be aiming at the same target. 
 
Although department stores in the UK may be scaling down their concession offer and 
building an own-brand repertoire, this trend is not overly evident in the Irish market.  
Indeed, it seems that for some stores, concessions are playing an increasingly important 
role, e.g. in 1993,  concession sales accounted for 14% of Arnotts turnover, by January 
1997 this had risen to 24.%.53  Concessions are obviously a two-edged sword - while they 
generate welcome revenue  their use has several down-sides.  It seems ironic that 
department stores in Dublin have facilitated a relatively risk free market entry for many 
multiples by encouraging them to test demand via in-store concessions.  Despite the 
short-term benefits of  this strategy, it could be argued that the department stores, by 
hosting concessionary fashions, may develop loyalty to particular brands, rather than to 
the store itself.54  The need to have a complete fashion offering has encouraged the stores 
to tolerate an overlap in branded concessions while the surge in available retail space has 
enabled well-established  concessions to move into independent units, in competition 
with the department store, but sometimes retaining their base in-store.  
 
While the search for new market segments is vigorous, the search for new territories is 
not.  Although two of the stores have located single departments in suburban shopping 
centres, none has expressed an interest in pursuing territorial expansion via shopping 
centre developments.   
 
Each store has pursued some form of related diversification, risk cushioned by 
partnership alliances, which enhances the customer offer, e.g. credit cards, bureaux de 
change, computer software, and electrical goods.  
 
Divergent Approaches 
 
While the department stores appear to have chosen a homogenous approach to product-
market related growth, key differences emerge in the methods used to grow the 
businesses. 
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Both Arnotts and Clerys have concentrated on growth through internal development, but 
there the similarity ends. Through good times and bad, Arnotts has pursued a consistently 
pro-active, high-risk strategy of expansion and has invested substantial resources to 
achieve its vision to be 'The Department Store' - the ultimate one-stop-shop.  As a public 
company, listed on the stock exchange, Arnotts strategy of investing for the future does 
not appear to be plagued by the 'short-termism' sometimes associated with management 
decisions driven by accountability to shareholders.  
 
Clerys, in contrast, is like a giant just awakening from slumber; there has been a time-lag 
in its reaction to both economic and market forces.  In line with the theory articulated 
previously, in the highly competitive environment which pertains in Dublin, this reactive, 
relatively minimalist, slow growth, low-risk investment  strategy carries, paradoxically, a 
very high risk. The appointment of a new chief executive in 1992 acted as a catalyst for 
change and the company is now moving into a higher gear. 
 
Brown Thomas has pursued a strategy of growth through acquisition, which is unusual for 
Irish retailers.  Two years after its acquisition, Brown Thomas implemented a high-risk 
strategy of killing-off its flagship acquisition, re-branding the original Switzers store, and 
building a different business.  Retaining the best of both businesses allowed Brown 
Thomas to capitalise on synergy.  The company is now pursuing an aggressive strategy of 
market development as it refurbishes and rebadges its acquired department stores in Cork, 
Galway and Limerick.   Its location in the majority of Republic of Ireland cities now 
qualifies it as a national retailer and it should reap some benefits from critical mass.  
Obviously, Brown Thomas is hoping to exploit the product and service differentiation 
advantages of its brand name, but while the name Brown Thomas is known nationally, 
Irish consumers can sometimes be parochial and the advantages it enjoys in Dublin may 
not transfer to other cities.  Only time will tell. 
 
 
In terms of quality and customer responsiveness, all stores must score well, although 
Clerys is handicapped by a slow start.  The stores constantly focus on innovativeness 
which distinguishes them easily from many high street competitors;  homogenous high 
streets should serve to highlight the attractions of the department stores.  However, it is 
difficult for any one of them to carve out an innovation which could not be copied by the 
others, e.g. while Arnotts has plans for a discount department, Clerys could probably 
imitate this if it chose to do so.  However, this particular approach might be alien to 
Brown Thomas image. 
 
Pro-active, high risk strategies should attract strong returns, especially in a buoyant 
economy.  The following figures taken from consolidated balance sheets (acknowledging 
the limitations of consolidated balance sheets) show each company's turnover, operating 
profit and return on sales %  for 1996 and 1997.  These results are interesting particularly 
when considered in the context of  Berry's contention that the level of retailing 
effectiveness required for survival continues to increase.  
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Table 1    Return on Sales 
 
Company  1997   1996  
 Turnover 
(millions) 
Op.Profit 
(millions) 
R.O.Sales 
     % 
Turnover 
(millions) 
Op.Profit 
(millions) 
R.O.Sales 
     % 
Arnotts 68.992 6.790     9.8 66.630 5.543     8.3 
Brown Thomas 73.220 4.954     6.8 69.483 7.158   10.3 
Clery's 20.615 .491     2.3 22.501   .703     3.1 
Source: Company Annual Reports (1997) 
 
In terms of efficiency,  Arnotts shows the best results with a respectable 9.8% return on 
sales, an improvement of 1.5% on 1996 and a turnover increase of 3.5%.  Brown Thomas 
appears to be improving effectiveness, but slipping in efficiency as turnover increased by 
5.3%, but operating profits fell, and return on sales slipped by 3.5%.  Overall, Clerys 
results must be considered disappointing, turnover is down by 8.4%, operating profit is 
down by 30.1%, and return on sales is down by 0.8%. Despite a booming economy, it 
would appear that Clerys strategies have yet to bear fruit. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It would be fair to say that Dublin's traditional department stores have closed the gap in 
areas where they were previously disadvantaged:  extended trading hours and car parks 
brings them in line with similar offers from shopping centre developments, upgraded 
merchandise and services enhances their appeal.  Although the routes and methods have 
differed, broadly speaking, the stores have chosen to arrive at the same destination in 
terms of customer focus; the end result is more companies jockeying for position around 
a particular market segment.  
 
By confining their attention to city-centre retailing, two of Dublin's traditional department 
stores have put all their eggs in one basket;  Brown Thomas has extended its reach 
through acquisition.  They all  have confidence that their strategies will succeed and 
ensure their survival into the second millennium.   
 
----------------------------------- 
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